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I. INTRODUCTION
Controversy over mandatory arbitration has skyrocketed as the presence
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment contracts has become
commonplace.' Employers no doubt prefer the efficiency-both in time and
money-that arbitration can offer as compared to traditional litigation. 2 The
confidentiality and finality that result from arbitration are also attractive
considerations.3 However, mandatory arbitration has been criticized in
employment discrimination disputes as being biased against employees,
particularly where the employers are "repeat players."4
In light of the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, 5 most courts
continue to uphold mandatory arbitration agreements in employment
See John-Paul Motley, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Employment
Contracts From Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertainty and Why Employers
Should Choose Not To Use Preemployment Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REv.
687, 688 (1998).
2 Robert S. McArthur, Comment, Arbitrary Civil Rights?: The Case of Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 881, 883 (1999) (stating that "arbitration is an
'advantageous vehicle' for employers who wish to avoid the cost, inconvenience, and
uncertainty of civil litigation."). From 1990 to 1995, companies choosing ADR saved
more than two million dollars over companies that chose litigation. Id. at 882 n.20.
3 Motley, supra note 1, at 714.
4 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 19, 26 (1999)
(recognizing that repeat players "are more able to mobilize legal and other resources to
maximize long-term gain."). Menkel-Meadow further emphasizes that mandatory
arbitration "advantages employers, prevents full evidentiary presentations, avoids jury
trials, and prevents the possibility of some kind of remedies ...." Id. at 39; see also
Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative) Forum:
Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 619 (1997) (stating that repeat players have an
obvious advantage over one-shot players who are unable to intelligently evaluate an
arbitration clause due to a lack of experience and inadequate resources in weighing the
pros and cons of dispute resolution mechanisms).
5 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994) (stating that the purpose is to
make agreements to arbitrate enforceable to the same extent as other contracts).
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contracts. 6 This trend, however, has met resistance when statutory rights are
involved. 7 When an agreement to arbitrate is placed in an employment
contract, it forces an individual either to sign the contract or to seek another
profession. 8 This take-it-or-leave-it offer creates the risk that individuals will
be manipulated into surrendering statutory rights.9 This fear has raised
concerns regarding the appropriateness of the mandatory arbitration of
statutory claims. 10
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.11 In Gilmer, the Court held that statutory claims could be
arbitrated pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).12 Although the
Court recognized that not all statutory claims would be appropriate for
arbitration, it held that a party who has agreed to arbitrate should be held to
such an agreement unless Congress specifically precludes a waiver of a
judicial forum. 13
This article addresses the controversy surrounding mandatory arbitration
of employment disputes arising from allegations of age discrimination. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) expressly gives claimants a
6 See discussion infra Part II, Im.
7 E.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1202-03 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 precludes compulsory arbitration of civil
rights claims); Thiele v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
1067 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the arbitration clause did not bar judicial resolution
of the age discrimination claim).
8 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1199.
9 Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 3,
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999)
(No. 98-1246).
10 See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),
No. 133, atE-4 (July 11, 1997) (stating that "agreements that mandate binding arbitration
of discrimination claims as a condition of employment are contrary to the fundamental
priiciples evinced in these laws" and are thus illegal and unenforceable); National
Academy of Arbitrators' Statement and Guidelines, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 103, at
E-1 (May 29, 1997) (stating that it "opposes mandatory employment arbitration as a
condition of employment when it requires waiver of direct access to either a judicial or
administrative forum for the pursuit of statutory rights.").
Perhaps recognizing such criticisms and concerns, the National Association of
Securities Dealers proposed a rule change to abolish mandatory arbitration of
employment discrimination claims. The Securities Exchange Commission approved this
change. The New York Stock Exchange has also proposed a similar rule change.
Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 7.
11500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991).
12 Id. at 26.
13 Id.
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statutory right to a jury trial.14 Thus, an individual who has a valid age
discrimination claim against his employer has a guaranteed right to a judicial
remedy, unless this right has been surrendered as a condition of employment.
If an individual is not fully aware of his guaranteed rights under the ADEA
when signing an employment contract that contains a mandatory arbitration
clause, he unknowingly and involuntarily surrenders his right to a jury trial.
In an attempt to prevent such a result, Congress enacted the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) in 1990.15 The OWBPA, which amended
§ 7 of the ADEA, was enacted to ensure that older workers are not misled
into waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the ADEA. 16
This note asserts that it was Congress' intent to preclude the waiver of a
judicial remedy by amending the ADEA with the enactinent of the OWBPA.
Exploring the issue of congressional intent and the purpose of the OWBPA
is particularly timely in light of the conflicting opinions issued by lower
courts as to the validity of mandatory arbitration agreements when ADEA
claims arise. Part II of this Note provides essential background information
on the history and enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements. It first
examines the applicability of the FAA to mandatory arbitration agreements
in employment contexts. Part II then discusses several Supreme Court
decisions, including the Gilmer decision, that provide the backdrop
necessary to understand the history of the enforceability of mandatory
arbitration in employment contracts. Part III analyzes the pertinent language
of the OWBPA as well as the purpose and legislative history behind its
enactment. Part I also discusses several court opinions interpreting
Congress' intent to preclude or uphold mandatory arbitration agreements.
Part IV explores the scope of the OWBPA to determine whether Congress'
concern was solely with exit incentive and group termination programs, or if
mandatory arbitration agreements were also a consideration. Part V
concludes that the OWBPA does in fact prohibit the waiver of a judicial
remedy unless such waiver is knowing and voluntary.
14 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1994).
15 Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 - 84 (1990) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. 621, 623, 626, 630 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
16 S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 5 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 7 (1990).
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11. TH-E ENFORCEABILITY OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTEXTS
The Supreme Court first addressed the validity of mandatory arbitration
agreements in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 17 In Gardner-Denver, the
Court refused to compel arbitration of an employee's Title VII claim despite
a mandatory arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement. 18
This presumption against the arbitrability of statutory claims continued well
into the 1980s until the Supreme Court handed down a series of opinions
recognizing that statutory claims could be the subject of an arbitration
agreement. 19 The arbitrability of statutory claims was again affirmed in
Gilmer, when the Supreme Court held that an employee was required to
arbitrate his age discrimination claim pursuant to a mandatory arbitration
agreement contained in a securities registration application. 20 To better
understand the Supreme Court's reasoning behind the above-mentioned
decisions, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, and the controversy
surrounding it, must be examined.
A. Applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act
Decisions that statutory claims can be the subject of arbitration
agreements appear to be the result of a federal policy favoring arbitration. 21
Such policy stems from the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA). 22
Congress enacted the FAA to ensure that agreements to arbitrate were
enforceable to the same extent as other contracts.23 However, the FAA
17 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
18 Id. at 47-51.
19Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985).
20 Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
21 Id.. at 26 (stating "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." (citing Moses H. Cole Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))).
22 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
23 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24
(observing that the FAA's purpose "was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements... and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts." (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20
(1985))).
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applies only to contracts that involve commerce.24 Although seemingly
broad in its coverage, § 1 of the FAA provides for several exclusions that
may prove problematic for mandatory arbitration agreements in employment
contracts.25 Section 1 provides that "[n]othing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."26 If construed
broadly, the language indicates that the FAA does not apply to any
employment contract. 27 If construed narrowly, the FAA applies to all
employment contracts except those involving employees who actually
transport people or goods in interstate commerce. 28
An overwhelming majority of circuit courts have construed the
exclusionary language of § 1 narrowly. 29 However, the Ninth Circuit has
adopted a broad interpretation of § 1 and has excluded all employment
contracts from FAA coverage. 30 The Supreme Court has not yet decided the
scope of the FAA in the context of employment contracts. 31 Thus, the FAA,
24 9 U.S.C. § 2. The pertinent part of § 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction ...shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
Id. The Supreme Court has held that a contract involves commerce within the
meaning of the FAA when fulfillment of the contract duties requires the employee to
work in commerce, produce goods for commerce, or engage in activties that affect
commerce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 276-77
(1995) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01
(1956).
25 9 U.S.C. § 1.
26 Id. (emphasis added).
27 Motley, supra note 1, at 691.
28 Id.
29 McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998); Penny v.
United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 1997); O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp.,
115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835
(8th Cir. 1997); Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir.
1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 357 (7th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Bums
Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications,
Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468
F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (lst Cir. 1971).
30 E.g., Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998).
31 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue on May 22, 2000. Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000). In the petition for writ of certiorari,
the Court was asked to review the 9th Circuit's conclusion that the FAA does not apply
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as interpreted today, extends statutory protection to most mandatory
arbitration agreements in the employment arena.
Aware of this federal policy favoring arbitration, employers have seized
the opportunity to include mandatory arbitration provisions in employment
contracts. 32 Such provisions commonly state that the individual agrees to
arbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of the employment
relationship. 33 When the term is included in an employment contract, an
individual is faced with one of two choices: sign the contract, thus waiving
important procedural and remedial protections, or find alternative
employment. 34 Because mandatory arbitration agreements are generally
signed before a dispute even exists, 35 the majority of individuals in need of a
job will have little choice but to agree to such provisions.
The current interpretation of the FAA extends statutory protection to
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts and upholds their
validity despite the unequal bargaining power that is present. Not only does
this result appear at odds with the language and congressional intent of the
FAA,36 but it also cannot be reconciled with Congress' subsequent efforts to
to labor or employment contracts. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070,
1070 (9th Cir. 1999). The Circuit City decision was supported by the 9th Circuit's
holding in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co. See supra note 30.
32 See Motley, supra note 1.
33 Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
34 Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998).
35 H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 23. The Committee on Education and Labor stated:
The preemptive waiver of rights occurs before a dispute has arisen and indeed
before an employee is even aware of any potential or actual pattern of
discrimination. Such a preemptive waiver also may preclude the employee from
asserting claims that arise out of subsequent discriminatory conduct by the
employer, e.g., hiring younger workers to replace the terminated older workers.
These waivers are both unfair and inconsistent with the intent of the ADEA.
Id.; see also Cole, supra note 4, at 620 (suggesting that a preemptive waiver of rights is
fundamentally unfair because employees suffer from judgmental bias, which causes them
to "systematically ignore or de-emphasize the likelihood that a low probability event will
affect them because the event has not occurred in the past." Thus, employees
misapprehend the risk that they will later engage in litigation with their employer.).
36 See 9 U.S.C. § 1; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39 (illustrating the FAA's purpose,
the chairman of the committee responsible for drafting the FAA assured the Senators that
the bill "is not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all." (citing Hearing
on S.4213 and S.4214 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
67th Cong. 9 (1923))); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case
Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 468 (1996) (stating "[a]t the time the FAA was
200
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protect employees and to restore equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.37 It offends public policy 38 and disregards
congressional intent39 to extend the FAA to mandatory arbitration
agreements that were entered into solely as a condition of employment. In
light of these considerations, the Ninth Circuit's broad construction of § 1
appears correct, 40
B. The Validity of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements: A Look at
Supreme Court Precedent
Despite the FAA's pro-arbitration mandate, the Supreme Court initially
refused to compel arbitration of statutory claims. 41 In Gardner-Denver,
Harrell Alexander filed a complaint with the Steelworker's Union alleging
racial discrimination by the defendant company. 42 The collective bargaining
agreement contained a mandatory arbitration provision that subjected his
claim to binding arbitration.43 Although Alexander filed a discrimination
passed, the language was intended to exclude contracts of employment from its
purview.").
37 Brief Amici Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. in
support of petitioner at 9-11, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70
(1998) (No. 97-889). The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) supports a
broad interpretation of the FAA's scope by referring to the policy reasons underlying the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Congress noted that the NLRA was necessary
because of "[tihe inequality of bargaining power between employees... and
employers..."/d. at 9 n.18 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
38 See Michele L. Giovagnoli, Comment, To Be or Not to Be?: Recent Resistance to
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Arena, 64 UMKC L. REv. 547,
562 (1996) (suggesting that mandatory arbitration agreements are a type of an adhesion
contract entered into as a result of the unequal bargaining power between employers and
employees); see also Gina K. Janeiro, Balancing Efficiency and Justice in Support of the
Equal Opportunity Commission's Policy Statement Regarding Mandatory Arbitration
and Employment Contracts, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 125, 141 (1999)
(stating that "arbitration provides structural advantages only for the employer.... This
makes it less likely that the employee understands how to make informed decisions
regarding the selection of an arbitrator, or what is involved in arbitrating a dispute.").
39 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
40 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating "[t]he exclusion in § 1
should be interpreted to cover any agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes ...
particularly where such agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment.").
41 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
42 Id. at 42.
43 Id. at 40-42.
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complaint with the EEOC,44 the arbitrator found that he had been discharged
for just cause and, as a result, the EEOC dismissed his claim.45
Subsequently, Alexander brought suit in federal court, alleging a violation of
Title VII.46 The Supreme Court held that the mandatory arbitration
agreement would not preclude Alexander's statutory right to trial under Title
VII.47 After analyzing Title VII, the Court concluded that "[the purpose and
procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to
exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral
decisions would be inconsistent with that goal." 48
The presumption against the arbitrability of statutory claims survived for
many years until the Supreme Court's decisions in what is known as the
Mitsubishi trilogy.49 In all three cases, the Court recognized that statutory
claims could be the subject of arbitration agreements. In Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,50 the Court compelled the arbitration
of antitrust claims. 51 The Court held that a party who makes a contract to
arbitrate "should be held to it unless Congress ... has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." 52
The Court continued to adhere to this reasoning in the final two decisions of
44Id. at 42.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 43. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with -respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
47 Id. at 47.
48 Id. at 56.
It should be noted that the Gardner-Denver decision involved a unionized employee
who agreed to submit his claim to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. In contrast, the Gilmer decision upholding the arbitrability of statutory claims
involved a non-unionized employee. See generally Cole, supra note 4 for a thorough
discussion of both cases and why Gardner-Denver should be reevaluated in light of the
Gilmer decision; see also Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv. for a discussion of why
mandatory arbitration in the collective bargaining context presents concerns. 105 F.3d
1465, 1473-79 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
49 Motley, supra note 1, at 695. See also McArthur, supra note 2, at 890.
50 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
51 Id. at 640.
52 Id. at 628.
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the trilogy. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,53 the Court
enforced an arbitration agreement brought pursuant to the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).54 And finally, in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,55 the Court found
statutory securities claims to be arbitrable under the FAA,
56 j,
The presumption against the arbitrability of statutory claims was
defeated by the Mitsubishi trilogy and the FAA found new life, giving rise to
the federal policy favoring arbitration. In 1991, the Court went a step further
and extended the enforcement of mandatory arbitration into the realm of
civil rights. 57 In Gilmer, the Court held that a non-unionized employee could
be compelled to arbitrate a discrimination claim pursuant to a mandatory
arbitration agreement in a securities registration application. 58 Robert Gilmer
worked as a manager of financial services for the defendant company and, as
a condition of employment, was required to register as a securities
representative. 59 This application contained a mandatory arbitration
agreement, which provided that Gilmer would arbitrate any dispute, claim,
or controversy arising out of his employment relationship with Interstate.
60
After six years of service and, at the age of 62, Gilmer was terminated.
61
This case arose after Gilmer brought suit in federal court alleging age
discrimination. 62 Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was
denied by the district court.63 The Fourth Circuit reversed this decision
stating there was no indication of a congressional intent to preclude
mandatory arbitration agreements. 64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and subsequently affirmed the Fourth Circuit's holding.65 The Court found
53 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
54 Id. at 242.
55 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
56 Id. at 485-86.
57 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 27, 35 (1991).
58 Id. at 23.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 24. To reach this decision, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Gardner-Denver, which held that Congress had intended to protect against the waiver
of ajudicial forum. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
64 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
65 Id. at 23. The Court stated that it did not agree that the enforcement of arbitration
agreements would be inconsistent with the purpose or intent behind the ADEA. Id. at 27.
203
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
that Congress had not communicated an intent to preclude the waiver of
ADEA claimants' statutory right to trial.66
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, the presumption
against the arbitrability of statutory claims has been largely destroyed.
Although Gilmer dealt solely with an ADEA claim, courts have routinely
applied the holding to a number of other federal statutes, including claims
brought under Title VII, 67 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)68 and
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),69 among others.
However, Congress has made several attempts to limit the use of mandatory
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. 70 One such attempt to protect
an ADEA claimant's rights was Congress' enactment of the OWBPA.
However, when deciding Gilmer, the Court did not fully address the
OWBPA and its potential effect on the validity of mandatory arbitration
agreements of ADEA claims. 71 Because Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate was
6 6 Id. at 26-27. The Court observed that if an intention to preclude waivers of a
judicial forum existed, it would be "discoverable in the text of the ADEA, its legislative
history, or an 'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying
purposes." Id.
67 E.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1486-87
(10th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir.
1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
68 E.g., Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 73-78 (1998).
69 E.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1117-
18 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Kramer v. Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1084 (5 th Cir. 1996)
(supporting the proposition that ERISA claims are arbitrable).
70 Brian K. Van Engen, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The
Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort
to Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CoRP. L. 391, 410-11 (1996) (discussing several
congressional bills, such as the Protection from Coercive Employment Agreements Act
and the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act, that have been introduced to limit the use
of mandatory arbitration agreements). The Protection from Coercive Employment
Agreements Act was proposed to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
ADEA, and the ADA, among others, to make it illegal to condition employment on
agreements to arbitrate. Id. The Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act was proposed to
amend Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the FAA, among others, to make mandatory
arbitration agreements unenforceable with regards to claims arising under the above
statutes. Id.
71 Congress amended the ADEA on October 16, 1990 by enacting the OWBPA.
This was after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gilmer. Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182,
1190 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998).
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signed in 1981,72 and his ADEA claim arose in 1987,73 the OWBPA would
not have applied74 and thus its applicability to mandatory arbitration
agreements was not before the Supreme Court.75 Nonetheless, the Gilmer
Court did acknowledge the OWBPA's existence in one footnote and in a few
sentences in the subsequent text.76 The Court then concluded, without any
discussion of the OWBPA's purpose or legislative history,, that Congress
"did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other non-judicial resolution of
claims, even in its most recent amendments to the ADEA. '77*
At .most, this conclusion is dicta. The issue of whether the OWBPA
precludes the waiver of statutory rights guaranteed under the ADEA was not
properly before the Court. Although in existence at the time the Gilmer
decision was handed down, the OWBPA did not apply to Gilmer's claims.
Had the Court desired to interpret the OWBPA in respect to mandatory
arbitration agreements in order to resolve all controversies, it should have
taken the proper steps in doing so. Instead, the Court chose to articulate a
blind conclusion. Without even so much as discussing the plain meaning of
the OWBPA's statutory language, the Court concluded that there was no
congressional intent to preclude the waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA
claimants.78 As such, the Gilmer decision has little precedential value to
address the effect of the OWBPA on the enforceability of mandatory
arbitration agreements.79
72 Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20,23 (1991).
73 Id.
74 Pub. L. No. 101-433 § 202, which states: "[tihe amendment made by section 201
shall not apply with respect to waivers that occur before the date of enactment of this
Act."
75 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190 n.5 (stating the Supreme Court did not consider the
newly enacted OWBPA in Gilmer).
76 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 & n.3.
77 Id. at 29; see also Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amicus Curiae at 13, Rosenberg (No. 98-1246) (arguing that in Gilmer, "the Court
carefully assessed whether compelling arbitration of Gilmer's ADEA claim was
inconsistent with the purpose of the pre-OWBPA ADEA. It offered no analysis, however,
of the text, [legislative] history, or purpose of the OWBPA amendments, which had just
been enacted by Congress .. .
7 8 1d. at 29.
7 9 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190 n.5 (concluding that because the OWBPA was not
considered in Gilmer, "current ADEA claims may require different treatment."); see also
Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 13,
Rosenberg (No. 98-1246) (stating "[t]he conclusion is inescapable that the possible
impact of the OWBPA on the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements was
left open in Gilmer.").
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III. STARTING ANEw: TE OWBPA AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination of older workers in the workplace. 80 Congress provided a
statutory right to a jury trial for those individuals discriminated against based
on age rather than ability. 81 Today, it appears that employers have
successfully circumvented this statutory right to a jury trial through the
inclusion of mandatory arbitration provisions in employment contracts.
Recognizing that the growing use of mandatory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts was both unfair and inconsistent with the intent of the
ADEA,82 Congress determined legislative action was needed. On October
16, 1990, Congress enacted the OWBPA, which sets forth minimum
standards for the waiver of rights under the ADEA.83 More specifically, 29
U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) provides that "[a]n individual may not waive any right or
claim under [the ADEA] unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. '84 The
ultimate question the courts have grappled with is exactly what "rights" does
the OWBPA refer to? The determination of this question is essential in order
80 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994)). Section 623(a)(1)
provides: It shall be unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age."
81 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)(1994).
82 See supra note 35, and accompanying text; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 41
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding that "compulsory arbitration conflicts with the
congressional purpose animating the ADEA .... ). In his dissent, Justice Stevens notes
that the ADEA authorizes the courts to grant broad injunctive relief in order to eliminate
age discrimination in the workplace. He stated that commercial arbitration does not
provide for class-wide injunctive relief and thus an essential purpose of the ADEA is
frustrated. See id. at 41-42.
83 S. REP. No. 101-263, at 15 (1990).
84 Id. at 6. To be a knowing and voluntary waiver, the following requirements must
be satisfied:
(1) the waiver is part of a written agreement; (2) the agreement makes specific
reference to rights and claims under the ADEA; (3) the waiver does not apply to
rights or claims that may arise after the date of the agreement itself; (4) the waiver is
exchanged for valuable consideration in addition to what the individual already is
entitled to receive; (5) the individual is given a reasonable time period in which to
review and consider the agreement; and (6) the individual is advised in writing to
consult with an attorney.
Id. Additional requirements are mandated in connection with an exit incentive or group
termination program. Id.
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to conclude whether or not Congress intended to preclude the waiver of a
judicial forum.
A. The Domain of Protected Rights
Two interpretations have emerged concerning the rights intended to be
precluded from waiver under the OWBPA. One interpretation suggests that
"the OWBPA protects against the waiver of a right or claim, not against the
waiver of a judicial forum."85 The other interpretation suggests that the
OWBPA protects procedural rights as well as substantive rights and thus
precludes the waiver of a judicial forum unless such waiver, is knowing and
voluntary. 86 Each interpretation must be viewed in light of the OWBPA's
purpose and legislative history.
1. The OWBPA Cannot Be Interpreted to Protect Only Substantive
Rights
As modified by the OWBPA, the ADEA provides that a claimant "may
not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing
and voluntary." 87 There are conflicting interpretations among the circuits
and lower federal courts as to what constitutes a right.88 This issue was
addressed in the recent Rosenberg decision. 89 In Rosenberg, the plaintiff was
85 E.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1995).
86 E.g., Thiele v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
1064-65 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
87 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(1994).
88 Compare Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 13 (holding "[t]o interpret the OWBPA's
reference to 'right' to include procedural rights-and the right to a judicial forum in
particular- would be to ignore the Supreme Court's repeated statements that arbitral and
judicial fora are both able to give effect to the policies that underlie legislation."), and
Williams, 56 F.3d at 660 (stating "the OWBPA protects against the waiver of a right or
claim, not against the waiver of a judicial forum."), and Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.,
146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing "the Supreme Court did not interpret the
OWBPA's reference to 'any right or claim' as encompassing procedural rights such as
the right to a judicial forum."), with Thiele, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (concluding "section
626(f)(1) is not ambiguous about the domain of protected rights because it defines that
domain as all rights conveyed by the ADEA."), and Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190 n.5
(stating "Congress amended the ADEA to provide that all waivers of rights under the
Act, apparently including the right to a jury trial, must be 'knowing and voluntary'.")
(citation omitted).
89 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 12-14.
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hired by the defendant as a trainee financial consultant.90 As a condition of
employment, the plaintiff was required to sign the U-4 Form, a standard
securities industry form, which bound her to arbitrate certain claims91 after
being hired. The plaintiff was later terminated and brought suit against her
employer for age and gender discrimination, among other claims. 92 The
employer sought an order to compel arbitration pursuant to the signed
agreement.93 The district court declined to compel the arbitration94 and the
First Circuit affirmed, although limiting its holding to the facts of this
particular case.95
Although arbitration was not compelled, the court proceeded to analyze
whether the OWBPA was enacted to preclude pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. 96 Rosenberg and the EEOC as amici argued that the OWBPA's
reference to "right" should be interpreted to include the statutory right to a
jury trial on ADEA claims. 97 The First Circuit disagreed, declining to define
a "right" as including the right to a judicial forum.98 The court held that
defining a "right" as including the right to a judicial forum would ignore
Supreme Court precedent that both arbitral and judicial fora are equally able
to give effect to the policies underlying the ADEA.99 Thus, concluding that
the OWBPA does not protect against the waiver of a judicial forum, the
Rosenberg Court held that Congress did not intend to preclude mandatory
arbitration agreements.100
90 Id. at 3.
91 Id. It is essential to note that the U-4 Form did not identify which claims were to
be arbitrated. The form simply referred to the rules of the organizations with which
plaintiff was registering. Id.
9 2 /d. at 4.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 1. The court stated that the decision in this case must be
limited to its facts. It clarified that "had Merrill Lynch taken the modest effort required to
make relevant information regarding the arbitrability of employment disputes available to
Rosenberg... it would have been able to compel Rosenberg to arbitration." Id. at 21.
96 Id. at 12.
97 Id. As amici, the EEOC states that the protection of an ADEA claimant's right to
a jury trial was Congress' top priority. This conclusion is drawn from S. REP. No. 101-
79, at 12-13 (1990) ("listing the loss of this right as the principal justification for
adopting a limitation on the waiver of ADEA rights."); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-664,
at 24 (1990); Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
at 17, Rosenberg (No. 98-1246).
98 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 13.
99 Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
100 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 13.
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The Rosenberg Court, as well as several others, fell for the Gilmer trap.
The reasoning behind the Rosenberg decision is based on the pre-OWBPA
ADEA analysis articulated in Gilmer. As stated previously, .the Gilmer
decision holds very little, if any, precedential value for courts in the post-
OWBPA era. Courts must resist the temptation to rely on the Gilmer
reasoning and begin to apply the OWBPA the way in which Congress
intended. 10 1 It is a well-known canon of statutory construction that when
interpreting the language of a statute, a court must look to the provisions of
the whole law and to its object and policy rather than focusing on a single
sentence or member of a sentence.102 In light of the OWBPA's purpose,1 03 it
can be concluded that Congress did intend to protect the procedural as well
as the substantive rights guaranteed by the ADEA.
2. The OWBPA Protects Both Substantive and Procedural Rights
The ADEA expressly gives claimants a statutory right to a jury trial.104
Employers, in an attempt to avoid litigation, 105 have increasingly dodged
their employees' statutory rights by including mandatory arbitration
agreements in employment contracts.1 06 These agreements increase the risk
that older workers will be coerced or manipulated into signing away their
ADEA protections. 10 7 This unjust result is exactly what the OWBPA was
designed to cure.10 8 Section 626(f)(1) of the ADEA, as amended by the
OWBPA, provides that "[a]n individual may not waive any right or claim
under this Act unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary." The Supreme
101 See S. REP. No. 101-263, at 5 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 7 (1990)
(stating the OWBPA was passed to ensure that "older workers are not coerced or
manipulated" into waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the ADEA).
10 2 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193 (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris
Trust & Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1993)).
103 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
104 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)(1994).
105 Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1670, 1673 (1996) [hereinafter Development in the Law] (stating that employers might
prefer arbitration to traditional litigation for "predictability, minimal appealability of
awards, limited discovery. .. and increased confidentiality.").
106 See Motley, supra note 1.
107 See H.R. REP. No. 101-664 at 20 (1990) (recognizing "[tlhere will always be
employees who feel that if they do not sign a waiver they will ... be out of a job .... ).
See also Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae at 3,
Rosenberg (No. 98-1246) (stating "[m]any individuals will have no realistic choice but to
sign such an agreement.").
108 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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Court has held that "[a court's] task is to give effect to the will of Congress,
and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."10 9 Congress enacted
the OWBPA to ensure older workers were not coerced or manipulated into
surrendering their right to seek legal relief under the ADEA.110 The statutory
language is consistent with this purpose in that it precludes the waiver of any
right under the ADEA unless such waiver is knowing and voluntary.I 1 The
language is clear-Congress intended to preclude the waiver of a judicial
forum absent a knowing and voluntary decision to do so.
This conclusion was recently articulated in Thiele v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 112 In Thiele, the plaintiff was employed as a
financial consultant for defendant from 1972 until 1996.113 As a condition of
employment, the plaintiff was required to register as a securities
representative with the New York Stock Exchange. 114 This form contained a
compulsory arbitration clause. 15 On at least four additional occasions, the
last occurring July 25, 1995, the plaintiff executed a U-4 Forhn, once again
agreeing to mandatory arbitration of any dispute, claim, or controversy. 116
The plaintiff was terminated and subsequently filed a claim with the court
alleging, among other things, age discrimination. 1 7 The court granted the
motion to compel arbitration but the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of
the order. 118
Upon reconsideration, the Thiele Court found that it had committed an
error in compelling arbitration without scrutinizing the agreement to ensure
it met the minimum standards for waiver of ADEA rights under the
OWBPA. 119 Applying the OWBPA's requirements, the court found that
plaintiff's 1995 U-4 Form arbitration clause did not contain a knowing and
voluntary waiver of the plaintiff's right to a jury trial, and was therefore
unenforceable under the OWBPA. 120 In reaching its conclusion, the Thiele
109 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993).
110 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
111 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(1994).
112 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
113 Id. at 1061.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1062.
118 Id
119 Id. at 1063.
120 Id. at 1067. The court entertained defendant's argument that plaintiff's waivers
were executed prior to the OWBPA's effective date, and thus the OWBPA was
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Court determined that § 626(f)(1) is unambiguous as to protected rights
because it extends to all rights conveyed by the ADEA. 121
According to its plain meaning, the OWBPA precludes the waiver of an
ADEA claimant's statutory right to a jury trial unless the waiyer is knowing
and voluntary. In addition to a clear congressional intent to preclude
unknowing and involuntary waivers of protected rights, the OWBPA's
legislative history provides further insight. 122 In opposing the enactment of
the OWBPA, the minority members of the Senate Labor, and Human
Resources Committee argued that the OWBPA would promote litigation
rather than the informal resolution of potential and actual disputes. 123
Because these members believed it was necessary to preserye rather than
limit the availability of forums to settle disputes, 124 they declined to join the
majority in enacting the OWBPA.
Both the plain meaning and the legislative history of the OWBPA evince
Congress' intent to preclude the waiver of a judicial forum. Had the Gilmer
Court properly considered the OWBPA, it would have discovered that
Congress' intent to preclude waivers of a judicial forum for ADEA claims
was in fact discoverable in the text of the ADEA, as amended, and the
inapplicable. The court concluded, however, that at least two securities forms were
executed after 1990 and these superceded his previous waivers. Id. at 1063-64.
121 Id. at 1064. The court further supports their plain meaning interpretation by
examining the OWBPA's legislative history. The OWBPA was enacted to ensure that
older worker's rights to seek legal relief were protected. In asserting that the right to legal
relief is equated with the right to a jury trial, the Thiele Court relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), which states "[i]n cases in
which legal relief is available and legal rights are determined, the Seventh Amendment
provides a right to [a] jury trial .... [B]y providing specifically for 'legal' relief,
Congress knew the significance of the term 'legal,' and intended that there would be a
jury trial on demand ..... " Thiele, 59 F.Supp. at 1065 (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at
583)). In the OWBPA's legislative history, Congress states that "[tihe language of the
Supreme Court's Lorillard decision is both unequivocal and highly instructive." H.R.
REP. No. 101-664, at 18 (1990).
122The Supreme Court has consistently held that when examining legislative
history, Congress' intent is best found in the Committee Reports on the bill, which
"represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved
in drafting and studying the proposed legislation." Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,
76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
123 S. REP. No. 101-263, at 59 (1990). The minority members also expressed a
concern that the OWBPA would do more harm than good. They state "[tihis title may not
harm an employee with the resources, time and inclination to pursue a claim through a
formal administrative or judicial process. It will however, harm the employee who is
unwilling or unable to pursue litigation for any number of reasons ... "Id.
124 Id. at59.
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OWBPA's legislative history.125 The determination of congressional intent
behind the OWBPA has serious implications for mandatory arbitration
agreements in employment contracts. Unless such agreements are knowing
and voluntary, their validity should not be upheld under § 626(f)(1) of the
ADEA. The question becomes whether mandatory arbitration agreements
can ever be truly knowing and voluntary when they are conditions of
employment.
B. The Knowing and Voluntary Requirements Under the OWBPA
The ADEA, as amended by the OWBPA, provides that claimants may
not waive any right or claim unless such waiver is "knowing and
voluntary." 126 Waivers of rights protected under the ADEA must meet
certain threshold requirements 127 to be valid and enforceable-namely, all
waivers must be shown to have been knowing and voluntary. 128 To satisfy
these requirements, legislative history indicates that "[a]t a minimum, the
waiving party must have genuinely intended to release ADEA claims and
must have understood that he was accomplishing this goal. The individual
also must have acted in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, or mistake of
material fact."' 129 The courts have a responsibility to scrutinize the knowing
and voluntary requirements of any waiver of an ADEA claimant's statutory
rights. 130 Given these requirements, mandatory arbitration agreements,
executed as a condition of employment, should seldom be held valid and
enforceable.
125 Recall that Gilmer set out the following test to determine congressional intent
behind the OWBPA: "If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the
ADEA, its legislative history, or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the ADEA's
underlying purposes." 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
126 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(1994).
127 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
128 S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 31.
129 Id. at 31-32.
130 Id. The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee expressly provided that
"[t]he Committee expects that courts reviewing the 'knowing and voluntary' issue will
scrutinize carefully the complete circumstances in which the waiver was executed." Id. at
32.
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1. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Cannot Be Sustained as
Satisfying the Knowing Requirement
A waiver of a statutory right under the ADEA cannot be considered
knowing unless it specifically refers to the right or'claim to be waived and
such waiver is not made on a prospective basis 1 31 In general, mandatory
arbitration agreements that arise as a condition of employment do not meet
the statutory requirements mandated under § 626(f)(2)(B) and (C). In many
cases, such waivers do not advise the employee that he is waiving his
statutory right to a jury trial under the ADEA, nor are these waivers executed
after the ADEA claim arises. 132
In light of the fact that many older workers are not fully aware of their
rights under the ADEA,133 the use of mandatory arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment have arguably become tools of manipulation and
abuse. Employers can draft arbitration clauses without any reference to the
ADEA right to a jury trial in an effort to avoid the high cost litigation that
would result from allegations of age discrimination. 134 Employees, unaware
of their statutory rights and the employer's underlying motives, will sign the
131 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B), (C). The pertinent language of these sections provides:
(1) [A] waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a
minimum-
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this
Chapter;,
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the
date the waiver is executed;..
Id.
132 See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating "had Merrill Lynch taken
the modest effort required to make relevant information regarding the arbitrability of
employment disputes available to Rosenberg... it would have been able to compel
Rosenberg to arbitration."); Williams, 56 F.3d at 661 (holding "[i]f we were to hold that
an arbitration clause in a U-4 Registration had to comply with the OWBPA's waiver
provisions, we would in effect be holding that employers and employees could never
enforce a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate."); Thiele, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (1999)
(finding that the U-4 Form waiver "did not specifically advise him that he was waiving
his rights and claims under the ADEA, nor was that waiver executed after Thiele's
ADEA claim arose.").
133 H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 20 (1990) (recognizing that surveys have shown that
most older workers do not know their rights under the ADEA).
134 See McArthur, supra note 2, at 882 (stating that the legal fees alone to defend a
civil rights discrimination suit can reach $200,000. Typical jury awards often approach 1
million dollars after accounting for punitive damages).
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agreement to arbitrate in order to secure their job. 135 Thus, the right to bring
a court action is inevitably lost if an age discrimination claim later arises.
The OWBPA was enacted to prevent this result. 136 It is now required that
any arbitration clause specifically refer to the rights and claims the employee
will be waiving. 137 If this essential information is excluded, the waiver will
not be considered knowing and should be declared void.138
Similarly, a waiver will not be considered knowing if it purports to
waive rights or claims that may arise after its execution. 139 This requirement
attempts to prevent "unfair and abusive waiver practices."' 40 Arbitration
clauses required to be signed as a condition of employment attempt to
preempt the statutory right to a jury trial before a claim ever arises to ensure
the employer will not face litigation. 141 Because the agreement is executed
as a condition of employment, the right to a jury trial is waived long before
any potential or actual discrimination shows its face. This result is unjust. 142
Thus, the OWBPA prohibits any agreement that requires the waiver of a
statutory right in advance of a dispute or claim.
2. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Fail Again - The Voluntary
Requirement
To be a valid and enforceable waiver, "[t]he individual [ ] must have
acted in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, or mistake of material
fact."' 43 When a mandatory arbitration agreement is required as a condition
135 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
137 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B) (1994).
138 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-664, at 20 (citing 133 Cong. Rec. S14383-84 (Oct. 15,
1987)) (concluding "[n]obody can knowingly waive his or her rights if he or she is
unaware of what they involve.").
139 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C).
14 0 H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 22-23.
141 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
142 S. REP. No. 101-263, at 33 (stating "[i]t is a basic principle of fairness that
employees should not be permitted to waive rights or claims on a prospective basis.").
See also H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 23 (1990) (stating "[t]he preemptive waiver of rights
occurs before a dispute has arisen and indeed before an employee is even aware of any
potential or actual pattern of discrimination .... These waivers are both unfair and
inconsistent with the intent of the ADEA.").
143 S. REP. No. 101-263, at 32.
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of employment, it is highly unlikely that the employee had a voluntary 144
choice in the matter. When an arbitration clause is included in an
employment contract, the employee's agreement to sign is a prerequisite to
securing the job position. Thus, such an agreement cannot be seen as
voluntary. It is a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation. 145 An individual in need of a
job will typically see no other alternative but to sign the agreement to
arbitrate. As such, employees are more or less being coerced into signing
mandatory arbitration agreements because securing the job depends on it.
Thus, when employment is contingent on an agreement to arbitrate, it is
difficult to conclude that the decision to comply was voluntary.
Mandatory arbitration agreements, when mandated as a condition of
employment, cannot be sustained under the knowing and voluntary
requirements of the ADEA, as amended by the OWBPA. Courts must
scrutinize such agreements by examining the circumstances under which the
waiver was executed.146 Employees, of course, can knowingly and
voluntarily decide to waive their right to a judicial forum after a dispute or
claim has arisen.147 However, such waivers are highly suspect when
executed as a condition of employment and before a dispute or claim even
exists.
IV. THE OW3BPA'S APPLICATION TO MANDATORY
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
There has been some discussion in the courts regarding the scope of the
OWBPA and whether Congress intended to extend its application to
144 The term "voluntary" is defined as follows: "Unconstrained by interference;
unimpelled by another's influence .... Proceeding from the free and unrestrained will of
the person .... The word, especially in statutes, often implies knowledge of essential
facts." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
145 Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998) (commenting "[florm U-4 is a
take-it-or-leave-it offer for anyone wishing to work anywhere in the United States as a
broker-dealer in that industry. It forces individuals like Duffield to opt for one of two
'choices': sign Form U-4 or seek another profession.").
146 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
147 See Motley, supra note 1, at 718 (stating "[p]ost-dispute agreements may make
employees feel more involved in the process, and managers may be surprised that
litigation claims actually decrease. Courts will likely enforce arbitration agreements
created after the employee brings the claim against the employer and fully knows the
consequences of the arbitration agreement."); see also Development in the Law, supra
note 105, at 1671 n.8 (concluding that "[plost-dispute agreements are not controversial
because they capture the benefits of arbitration .... without... the specter of coercion
present in mandatory agreements.").
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mandatory arbitration agreements of employment disputes. Some courts have
declared that the OWBPA is concerned only with exit incentives and group
termination programs, and thus has no effect on the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate employment disputes.148 Other courts have held that
the OWBPA does not contain such limiting language and that Congress did
intend to extend the waiver requirements to mandatory arbitration
agreements.149
The OWBPA's language does not support the argument that Congress
was only concerned with exit incentives and other termination programs, and
did not consider waivers that result from agreements to arbitrate employment
disputes. 150 There is no limiting language to support this conclusion. Instead,
the OWBPA speaks generally that any waiver of any right or claim under the
ADEA must be knowing and voluntary. 151 The language does not specify
that a waiver must only be in connection with exit incentives or group
termination programs. It simply refers to a waiver in general. The statutory
language further supports this conclusion. Section 626(f)(2) articulates the
minimum requirements necessary for a waiver to be considered knowing and
voluntary. However, the OWBPA expressly provides for further
requirements when the waiver is requested in connection with exit incentives
or other termination programs. 152 If the OWBPA was meant to apply solely
to such programs, this language would be superfluous. Because older
148 Williams, 56 F.3d at 660 (holding "[i]n enacting the OWBPA, Congress'
primary concern was with releases and voluntary separation agreements in which
employees were forced to waive their rights."); Seus, 146 F.3d at 181 (finding "Congress,
through the OWBPA, has protected terminated employees who waive their substantive
rights under ADEA in exchange for a more favorable severance package; however, we
find no clear indication that Congress was likewise concerned with protecting employees
who agree to arbitrate claims that may arise during the course of their employment.").
149 E.g., Thiele, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1065 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (stating "[a]lthough
Congress did express a concern for termination agreements, they did not limit the
application of § 626(f) to such agreements.").
150 Interview with James Brudney, Professor of Law at The Ohio State University in
Columbus, Ohio (Jan. 12, 2000). James Brudney was involved in the OWBPA's
enactment. When asked whether the OWBPA was concerned only with exit incentives
and other termination programs, he responded that the language was written broadly for a
reason. He explained that to have specifically extended the waiver requirements to
mandatory arbitration agreements could have led to the demise of the bill. Instead, the
language was written in general terms to not specifically prohibit these agreements, but to
also not exclude them from OWBPA application. Although Brudney did admit the
OWBPA focuses on waivers associated with exit incentives and termination programs, he
also stated that this was not the only concern.
151 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (1994).
152 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii)-(f)(1)(H) (1994).
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workers are just as likely to be coerced or manipulated into surrendering
statutory rights when executing pre-dispute arbitration agreements as they
are when executing arbitration agreements in connection with exit incentives
and termination programs, the OWBPA should be interpreted to apply to all
such waivers. Any other conclusion ignores congressional intent and the
OWBPA's purpose. 153
V. CONCLUSION
The increased use of mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment has no doubt been the result of many courts' over-extension and
misapplication of the Gilmer decision. Employers have used such
agreements to bypass guaranteed statutory rights in an effort to avoid the
high cost litigation that results from discrimination in the workplace. In light
of the increased risk that employees were unknowingly and involuntarily
waiving statutory rights in order to secure a job position, Congress enacted
the OWBPA to establish certain minimum requirements for a valid and
enforceable waiver of such rights. The OWBPA requires that a waiver of any
right or claim under the ADEA be knowing and voluntary. Employees of
course can knowingly and voluntarily decide to Waive their right to a judicial
forum after a dispute or claim has arisen. However, such waivers are highly
suspect when executed as a condition of employment and before a dispute or
claim even exists.
As long as post-OWBPA ADEA courts continue to rely on Gilmer's pre-
OWBPA ADEA reasoning as precedent, the purpose of the OWBPA will
remain unfulfilled. Courts must acknowledge Gilmer's limitations and begin
to apply the OWBPA as Congress intended. Until the 8upreme Court or
Congress communicate a different result, lower courts should hold that
agreements to arbitrate, when mandated as a condition of employment, are
inconsistent with the OWBPA's purpose and fail to meet the knowing and
voluntary requirements of a valid waiver.
153 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of the OWBPA to
waivers included in a termination agreement. In Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522
U.S. 422, (1998), the Court concluded that the waiver could not bar the employee's
ADEA claim because it did not comply with the knowing and voluntary requirements of
the OWBPA. In reaching its decision, the Court held that the policy behind the OWBPA
is clear to protect the rights and benefits of older workers. As such, the Court found it
was bound to take Congress at its word. Id. at 426-27. Although the Court did not
discuss the OWBPA's application to mandatory arbitration agreements, its recognition
and adherence to Congress' intent suggests that the Court would extend the OWBPA to
protect the rights of older workers whenever ADEA rights are involved.

